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Abstract 
Case·mix accounting systems have been advanced as both reflecting the economic reality that underlies a 
hospital's various "product lines", as defined by DRG prospective payment categories, and fucilitating rational 
decision making regarding resource acquisition, deployment and use. This article uses the institutional 
perspective to extend this conceptualization of case-mix accounting systems. The institutional perspective 
proposes that many elements of organizational structure, like case-mix accounting systems, rellect as much 
a need to conform to societal expectations of acceptable practice as the technical imperative of fostering 
rationality. This article also extends institutional theory regarding the issues of power and decoupling by 
conSidering institutiona1ization to be an unfinished process in the health-care context, wherein the active 
agency of individuals and organizations is subjected to systematic examination In this specific context, case-
mix accounting may playa significant role in establishing and perpetuating - not merely supporting - the 
very social structure of legitimacy, and may consequently be considered an interest-oriented activity having 
the potential to penetrate and alter the internal operating processes of financIally strained hospitals. 
According to orthodox theorists, the purpose of 
accounting is to facilitate rational decision 
making by faithfully representing the task 
technology or economic reality of the organiza-
tion (e.g. Ijiri, 1965; Homgren, 1977; Cooper & 
Kaplan, 1991; Chandler et al, 1991). Consistent 
with this perspective, within the health-care 
sector, case-mix accounting systems, based on 
diagnostic-related groups (DRGs), ostensibly 
help hospitals control costs and encourage 
planning by permitting them to improve the 
management of their various "product lines". In 
turn, state and federal governmental agencies as 
well as private insurers, have developed DRG-
based prospective payment frameworks that 
categorize patients into distinct classes accord-
ing to the nature and intensity of the services 
(or "products") they receive (Fetter, A. et al., 
1991 ). Once these services are partitioned, one 
can use case-mix accounting systems to monitor 
each "product line" so as to achieve optimum 
efficiency and effectiveness within the hospital 
and each subunit, as well as the overall health-
care sector whose costs constitute 12.2% of the 
U.S.'s GNP (Fetter & Freeman, 1986; Warren, 
1988; Noble, 1992) . 
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In contrast with this orthodox perspective, 
institutional theorists propose that an organiza-
tion's survival requires it as much to conform 
to societal norms of acceptable practice as to 
achieve high levels of production efficiency and 
effectiveness. Thus, many aspects of an organiza-
tion's formal structure, policies and procedures 
serve to demonstrate a conformity with the 
institutionalized rules and expectations ex-
pressed by external constituents (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Accordingly, the DRG framework and case-mix 
accounting systems may be expected to play 
heightened, though ritualistic roles in the 
heavily institutionalized environment of hospitals, 
where they may be treated as ceremonial 
systems for creating and affirming order and 
meaning, for executing procedures in sanc-
tioned ways, and for providing accounts of 
activities in terms that make them seem 
reasonable and acceptable to such external 
constituents as the u.s. Federal government, 
which is a major payer of health-care costs under 
the Medicare and Medicaid programs (Scott & 
Black, 1986; Scott, 1987; Scott & Meyer, 1983, 
esp. pp. 137-152 that provide a discussion of 
how institutional and technical or economic 
forces play out differently in such different 
"sectors" as the health-care context which 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977, assert may be especially 
subject to institutional forces). 
A paradox arises here, however, in that these 
externally directed and relatively simple sym-
bolic displays tend to underrepresent the 
complexities and indeterminacies in how hos-
pital members actually carry out their assigned 
tasks. Thus, Meyer & Rowan (1977; Meyer, 
1983, p. 237) reasoned that organizations tend 
to avoid massive dysfunction by "decoupling" 
their external image systems from their internal 
operating processes. More specifically, they 
observed that "to maintain ceremonial confor-
mity, organizations that reflect institutional rules 
tend to buffer their formal structures from the 
uncertainties of technical activities by becoming 
loosely coupled, building gaps between their 
formal structures and actual work activities" 
(1977, p. 341). 
Despite a growing body of research lending 
empirical support (recent examples include 
Fennell & Alexander, 1987; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 
1988a, b; Levitt & Nass, 1989; Mezias, 1990), 
institutional theory has also drawn criticisms, 
the most prominent of which focus on the issues 
of power and decoupling. Concerning the first 
issue, Perrow (1985, 1986) asserted that the 
institutional perspective is inattentive to power 
and group interest. In response to this criticism, 
DiMaggio (1988; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Tolbert, 1988; Zucker, 1988a, b) noted an 
apparent paradox rooted in the two senses in 
which we have used the term "institutionaliza-
tion". Institutionalization as an outcome places 
organizational structures and practices beyond 
the reach of interests and politics; expectations 
of acceptable practice exist and organizations 
passively conform to them. By contrast, institu-
tionalization as a process is profoundly political 
and reflects the relative power of the organized 
interests and actors who mobilize them. 
Providing further insight into the distinction 
between outcome and process, Clegg (1989a, 
b) emphasized the importance of interpreting 
power as a set of rules or disciplinary practices, 
rather than as some dominant though abstract 
ideology. He observed a pervasive tendency 
among researchers to think of power as a 
"thing", without recognizing that it must also 
involve the property of influencing social 
relations through the process of using rules that 
establish meaning in organization. Key within 
Clegg's analysis of rules as disciplinary practices 
is the concept of surveillance: 
The concept of "disciplinary practice" ... is meant to 
depict those micro-techniques of power which inscribe 
and normalize not only individuals but also collective, 
organized bodies. For instance, any comparative applica-
tion of performance data or other forms of surveillance 
would capture the sense of this. Surveillance, whether 
personal, technical, bureaucratic or legal, is the central 
issue. Its types may range through forms of, for instance, 
supervision, routinization, formalization, mechanization 
and legislation which seek to effect increasing control 
of employees' behavior, dispositions and embodiment, 
precisely because they are organization members. . .. 
Through such mechanisms, individuals or bodies collec-
tively, as well as abstract properties of goods and services 
INSTITUTIONAL lliEORY PERSPECTNE 67 
[such as DRG's 1 may be discriminated and categorized 
through diverse tactics of rationalization, localized 
tactics which in their specificity of time, place, aims and 
objectives reinforce and borrow from each other to form 
an overall anonymous strategy of discipline. At the more 
general level of discipline, this will form organizations 
into discursive locales of competing calculations. Each 
disciplinary practice, in its applications, will calculate 
organizational rationality from distinct auspices of power 
and knowledge (Clegg, 1989b, pp. 100-101). 
Like Perrow, Clegg was particularly critical of 
the inattention in institutional theory to the 
nature of rules and social relations of meaning: 
what becomes institutionalized depends pre-
cisely on the power of the organizational actors' 
translation and use of societal expectations. He 
urged that such organizational disciplinary 
practices as case-mix accounting be studied 
with the use of multiple "disciplinary matrices" 
- in the current context, the orthodox and 
institutional perspectives. 
Based upon this first major criticism of 
contemporary institutional theory, our analysis 
addresses the following research question: 
Research question 1 (RQ 1). To what extent are vested 
interests, and particularly those of the state, served by 
the development, implementation and modification of 
institutionalized organizational practices (su"h as case-
mix accounting systems)? 
The second criticism concerns Meyer & 
Rowan's (1977; Meyer, 1983) assertion that 
organizations tend to avoid massive dysfunction 
by "decoupling" their external and relatively 
simplistic image systems from their complex 
and relatively idiosyncratic internal operating 
processes. Concerning this issue, Powell (1985, 
1988), for example, observed that the central 
research question concerning the institutional 
perspective is the extent to which externally 
directed symbolic displays do, in fact, penetrate 
and alter internal operating processes. In like 
manner, Tolbert (1988, pp. 101, 109) pointed 
to an irony residing in institutional theory. She 
observed that although this perspective explicitly 
links macro-level or field-level expectations 
with micro-level organizational practices (see, 
for example, DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, esp. pp. 
154-156), research has focused almost exclu-
sively on macro-effects, leaving institutionalized 
practices within organizations largely unexam-
ined. Tolbert (1988) concluded that, over time, 
specific organizational rules and practices 
developed in response to societal expectations 
become a normative, taken-for-granted part of 
organizational life, thus transcending their sym-
bolic status and influencing the way external 
and internal constituents think about and act 
concerning the organization. 1 
lOne finds this same concern for decoupling in the sociology of professions literature. Here, it has been traditionally 
argued that because practitioners have internalized the norms and standards of professional practice, the actual imposition 
of formalized rules and procedures is unnecessary and may even cause professional-bureaucratic conflict and thus impair 
performance (Hall, 1972; Freidson, 1986; Raelin, 1986). Hence, formalized control may be seen as decoupled from 
backstage operating processes. More recently, however, Abbott (1988, pp. 323-325) recognized this decoupling as 
problematic. To begin with, he acknowledged the traditional stance that industrialized countries indeed tend to 
institutionalize professional expertise in people rather than in structures or rules. But he found a growing trend to 
institutionalize expertise in organizations, as well, particularly in such professions associated with bureaucracies as medicine, 
where professional knowledge resides within the structure of the organization itself, and decision autonomy rests not with 
the individual practitioners, but with those who structure their roles. For example, one could envision the exercise of 
management control through DRGs and related case-mix accounting systems as a form of organizational structure that 
dilutes the raison d'etre of its professionals - expertise and knowledge. As a result, the practice of formal control and 
backstage operating processes may become coupled. 
In a like manner, Freidson (1986) set out to understand how professional organizations function, how people in them 
are differentiated by hierarchical position, and how these institutional positions influence the work of creating, 
communicating and applying expert knowledge. Freidson recognized the differentiation and decoupling that exists between 
the practitioners and administrative components of such professional bureaucracies as hospitals, and saw power, group 
interest and decoupling as conditioned by the different duties they perform. Lacking control over policy making and 
resource allocation, practitioners exercise power over the generation of resources in that they are the ones who meet 
directly with their clients (or here, patients) and perform the actual service delivery work. Thus, their power stems from 
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The inherent tension implied in the notion of 
decoupling can also be found in Clegg's (1989a, 
b) observation that a theory of power must 
incorporate both obedience and resistance to 
rules or disciplinary practices. The threads of 
power run through the whole nature of decoup-
ling because, as Clegg (1989a, pp. 188-189) 
said, "The dialectic of resistance resides in the 
realist view that power necessarily involves 
reciprocity because it is always constituted 
within a relational universe of meaning". Re-
emphasizing the importance of process, Clegg 
(1989a, p. 199) argued that one must first 
reproduce the articulation of interests through 
disciplinary practices before reconstituting the 
existing power structures. Indeed, this repro-
duction process is a significant component of 
power, and its transformation, in turn, repre-
sents an effective resistance to power. More-
over, just as the application of power is not 
always overt, resistance to power need not 
involve overt conflict. Clegg (1989a, b) observed 
that there is a general tendency among those 
subject to power and controlling resources to 
resist by means of circumventing or diverting 
to their own ends the existing networks of 
power rather than by overtly confronting them. 
He concluded that the issue of decoupling -
expressed in such terms as "transforming", 
"circumventing", or "diverting" rules and dis-
ciplinary practices - is ultimately mitigated by 
the relative power of those exercising versus 
those responding to disciplinary practices. 
Drawing upon this second major criticism of 
contemporary institutional theory, our analysis 
addresses the following research question: 
Research question 2 (RQ 2). To what extent do 
institutionalized legitimation practices (in the current 
context, case-mix accounting systems developed in 
response to DRG payment systems) penetrate and 
influence internal organizational practices? 
The purposes of the remainder of this paper are 
(a) to extend our understanding of case-mix 
accounting systems by considering the various 
institutional processes complicit in their exis-
tence and effects beyond merely achieving 
control over the cost of health-care delivery and 
faithfully representing the economic reality of 
hospitals, and (b) to address the two major 
criticisms of institutional theory concerning the 
issues of power and decoupling expressed as 
research questions 1 and 2, respectively. So as 
not to be overly mysterious about the product 
of our analysis, we conclude that (a) such 
apparently neutral societal and organizational 
practices as the DRG framework and case-mix 
accounting systems can have variegated effects 
on different types of hospitals and areas of 
medical practice, on what types of patients get 
served in what types of hospitals, and possibly 
on who will live and who will die; and (b) the 
issues of decoupling and power appear to be 
closely intertwined, with the relative power of 
different interest groups conditioning the extent 
to which external imagery is decoupled from 
backstage processes. 
DRGs AND CASE-MIX ACCOUNTING: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY PERSPECTIVE 
This section briefly reviews the orthodox 
perspective regarding DRGs and case-mix 
accounting in the health-care environment and 
then juxtaposes this conceptualization using the 
extended institutional theory perspective with 
reference to the two research questions set forth 
in the preceding section. 
client contact and fees, and from the performance of work that cannot be wholly commodified. Preoccupied with dealing 
with the political and economic forces their organizations face, administrators focus on formulating artificially limited, 
consistent and overly formalized procedural and substantive rules that control the manner in which the professional work 
is performed. Applying these rules and policies, practitioners transform them according to their judgment and the day·to-
day exigencies of specific client service work. The formal procedures administrators prescribe are applied inconSistently 
and informally by the practitioners (1986, pp. 226-227), and a decoupling consequentially takes place in the transformation 
of formal knowledge communicated by administrators in the form of procedural and substantive rules to practitioners. 
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The DRG and case-mix accounting 
phenomena: the orthodox view 
The appearance of DRGs as an approach to 
regulating and managing hospitals is a recent 
example of a 45-year effort - dating back to 
the 1946 passage of the Hospital Survey 
Construction Act and amplified by the Medicare-
Medicaid legislation in the early 1960s - during 
which the Federal government developed a 
vested interest in controlling the costs of health-
care delivery. Governmental interest in contain-
ing these costs increased with PL 92-603, the 
Social Security Amendments of 1972, whose 
purpose was to limit Medicare-Medicaid pay-
ments and to establish mechanisms for provid-
ing information to effect better control. The 
National Health Planning and Resources Dev-
elopment Act of 1974 was also directed at cost 
containment and mandated the use of uniform 
hospital accounting systems, a description of the 
financial operations and costs incurred by each 
hospital participating in the Medicare-Medicaid 
program, and the provision for a formal budget 
review of each participating hospital. 
Throughout the mid-1970s and the Carter 
Administration, the Federal government at once 
assured the hospital industry some measure of 
prosperity in the sense that it would be paid for 
rendering services to a large block of impecunious 
patients, and also caused the industry anxiety in 
the sense that it became exposed to at least 
some measure of Federal control and interven-
tion (Starr, 1982; Sapolsky, 1987; Stevens, 
1989). This concern for controlling costs was 
demonstrated by the heavily debated Hospital 
Mandatory Cost Containment Program intro-
duced by the Executive Branch in 1977. The 
Carter Administration's proposed cost contain-
ment program sought directly to contain both 
public and private reimbursements for hospitals 
(Abernathy & Pearson, 1979; Sapolsky, 1987) 
and thus to regulate across the entire spectrum 
of health-care recipients. A united hospital 
industry (for example, the American Hospital 
Association and the Association of American 
Healthcare Systems), defeated the bill but 
promised in its stead self-restraint in hospital 
charges (Demkovich, 1979). The industry's 
heavy lobbying efforts finally produced a more 
lenient substitute bill, HR 5635, that encour-
aged a voluntary cost containment effort on the 
part of hospitals and the appointment of a study 
commission to consider and recommend to the 
hospitals various cost control measures. 
Despite the presence of such cost contain-
ment legislation, however, health-care costs 
continued to escalate (Starr, 1982; Havighurst, 
1987; Warren, 1988; Stevens, 1989). Faced with 
the industry'S continued strong opposition to 
the imposition of direct, inflexible controls 
(Demkovich, 1979; Brown, 1988) and consis-
tent with its campaign deregulation promises 
(Brown, 1988; Havighurst, 1988), the Reagan 
Administration offered a prospective payment 
proposal as a less direct way of regulating costs 
for those patients for whom the Federal govern-
ment had direct fiscal responsibility - Medicare 
and Medicaid patients. Stevens (1989) defines 
this increasingly active Federal influence as the 
"New Standardization". This Federal initiative 
was supported by the American Hospital Asso-
ciation and the Federation of American Health-
care Systems. The prospective payment for 
health-care services legislation was signed into 
law in October of 1983. This Social Security 
Amendment states that 
Medicare payments will be made at a predetermined, 
specific rate for each discharge. All discharges are 
classified according to a list of diagnosis related groups 
(DRGs). This list contains 470 specific categories (p. 
39754). We believe that by including all inpatient 
operating costs, the system maintains financial incen-
tives which will pennit hospitals to plan the most 
efficient use of resources given their unique operating 
circumstances. Thus, the decisions concerning the 
allocation of all resources rest with the managers 
responsible for planning care. It is only in this manner 
that the most effective use of health care funds can be 
achieved (Department of Health and Human Services, 1 
September 1983, p. 39761, emphasis added). 
Basically, PL 98-21 replaced a cost-based, 
retrospective reimbursement system with a 
diagnosis-specific prospective payment plan by 
which the Federal government fixed the diag-
nostic categories (that is, the DRGs) and 
payment structure for each treatment category. 
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Under PL 98-21, if a hospital's costs exceed 
specified payment schedules for Medicare 
patients, the hospital must absorb the excess 
costs. Each DRG is defined in terms of one or 
more of the following variables: principal 
diagnosis, operating room procedures, comor-
bidities and complications ( secondary diagnoses ), 
age, and discharge status. Thus, the DRGs 
represent a multivariate system for classifying 
hospital patients into mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive groups, under the assumption that 
types of cases or "product lines" have similar 
patterns of Federal payments and also, ideally, 
resource consumption (Fetter & Freeman, 
1986; Averill, 1991; Fetter, 1991). By clustering 
patients into medically meaningful groups, PL 
98-21 seeks to minimize the Federal govern-
ment's Medicare expenditures. Such case-mix 
data can also help such third-party payers as 
Blue Cross to monitor differences among 
hospitals and to contain costs by facilitating 
comprehensive budget reviews (at an appro-
priate rate level) and charge setting (within an 
appropriate rate structure) for non-Medicare 
patients. 
In turn, the hospital industry has developed 
case-mix accounting systems to generate in-
formation pertaining to the costs of delivering 
the DRG products to patients (Borden, 1988; 
Chandler et al., 1991). By closing the account-
ing circle of matching revenues (DRG-based 
prospective payments) with costs (isolated by 
case-mix accounting systems expressed in terms 
of the DRG structure), information ostensibly 
becomes available for evaluating the profitability 
of the various product lines and thereby guiding 
both resource allocation decisions and the 
performance appraisals of various hospital sub-
units and individual health-care delivery clini-
cians and technicians (Fetter & Freeman, 1986; 
Fetter, A. et al., 1991). This approach assumes 
that DRG and case-mix accounting systems seek 
to represent faithfully the costs of the underlying 
task technology of health-care delivery while 
diagnosing the illness and delivering the service. 
In essence, the case-mix accounting systems dev-
eloped around DRG categories merge with epid-
emiological and management science approaches 
to health administration by directly linking the 
costs and outcomes of providing health services 
and by providing incentives for cost control and 
efficiency (Fetter & Freeman, 1986). 
The case-mix accounting system would, in 
theory, provide hospital administrators with 
both a rigorous form of accountability and 
measures of production efficiency that encour-
age comparisons among departments and physi-
cians, thereby establishing and documenting a 
relationship between medical and administra-
tive decisions (Thompson et al., 1979; Fetter et 
al., 1980; Fetter, A. et a£, 1991). On this point, 
Eastaugh (1987), for example, has suggested 
that hospitals could and should use DRGs and 
the resultant case-mix accounting information 
to offer only those products that promise a 
certain threshold of profitability. Further, patients 
who cannot be profitably served by any given 
hospital or clinician should be referred else-
where for treatment (Fetter & Freeman, 1986; 
Eastaugh, 1987). In addition, case-mix account-
ing systems should facilitate a number of 
management philosophies or techniques hos-
pitals value: improved patient treatment schedul-
ing; the delegation of more budgetary and 
accounting activities to departmental managers 
thus increasing budgetary participation; the 
deployment of the medical staff in response to 
patient needs; and the formation of physician 
cost-control committees (Cook et a£, 1983, 
1985; Young & Saltman, 1983; Smith & Mick, 
1985). 
An extended institutional theory perspective 
Earlier, we posed the following research 
question: 
RQ 1. To what extent are vested interests, and particularly 
those of the state, served by the development, implemen-
tation and modification of institutionalized organiza-
tional practices (such as case-mix accounting systems)? 
An initial and general response is that one 
should not treat the Federal government as a 
monolithic entity that impartially reviews, inter-
prets and transmits societal expectations. Rather, 
it is a specific entity that can exhibit self-interest 
(Perrow, 1985, 1986) and may thus become an 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY PERSPECTIVE 71 
active force in shaping and molding societal 
expectations. Reflecting an institutional per-
spective, Scott provided insight consistent with 
this suggestion: 
Which environmental agents are able to define the 
reigning forms of institutional structure will be deter-
mined largely by political contests among competing 
interests. Outcomes will be influenced not only by 
differential resources and sanctioning facilities but will 
also be strongly shaped by the agents' differential ability 
to lay successful claim to the nonnative and cognitive 
facets of the political processes: those identified by such 
concepts as authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty. 
Outcomes will also be influenced by the structure of the 
state itself and its relation to the penetration of society. 
Organizational scholars must bring the state back in 
as an important institutional actor not only in its own 
right, but reconceptualizing as well political systems in 
ways that reveal the varied role that political and legal 
structures play in shaping the institutional frameworks 
within which organizations of varying types operate 
(1987, p. 509, emphasis added). 
Through its Medicare and Medicaid programs, 
the Federal government has developed an 
abiding interest in health-care delivery; with the 
ever-increasing associated costs, it has also 
developed a keen, instrumentally rational objec-
tive of controlling those costs. But its direct or 
overt attempts to control costs for all patients 
have met strong and effective opposition from 
the health-care industry - particularly the 
American Hospital Association and the American 
Medical Association - that has countered with 
promises of voluntary cost control, promises 
that have subsequently failed (Abernathy & 
Pearson, 1979; Demkovich, 1979). Here, the 
hospital industry as a subordinated agency was 
at first able to act collectively to achieve 
effective resistance (Clegg, 1989a). Withdraw-
ing from its overt SOcial-regulatory position of 
directly controlling costs for all patients, the 
government responded by developing an approach 
to covertly controlling costs by paying specific 
rates for specific services rendered to only 
Medicare and Medicaid patients amid the rhetoric 
of deregulating health-care delivery and support-
ing decentralized decision making (Brown, 1988; 
Havighurst, 1988). 
The health-care industry initially supported this 
covert approach. It was, after all, apparently 
consistent with medical rationality, based as it was 
on medically meaningful diagnostic groupings of 
patients. It appears that DRGs and the resulting 
case-mix accounting systems served simul-
taneously first and foremost to provide an 
instrumental solution to controlling Federal cost 
outlays, and secondarily, as a political exchange 
by apparently depoliticizing health-care delivery 
through the exercise of covert rather than overt 
control (Fombrun, 1986). One may infer that the 
medical-organizational-institutional practices 
associated with the development, implementation 
and use of the DRG framework were influenced 
by power and self-interest of (here) the Federal 
government (Clegg, 1989a, b). Note, however, 
that the Federal government was not omnipotent, 
but was constrained to use a covert, surveillance-
based disciplinary practice rather than the direct 
control of costs for all patients it at first preferred. 
Extending this line of thought, Starr (1982) 
predicted that as a consequence of the Carter 
Administration's failure to rationalize and control 
medical services using the public-sector logic of 
direct regulatory intervention, health-care ser-
vice delivery and the role of the Federal 
government therein would eventually become 
rationalized under the private-sector logics of 
commercialism and depersonalization (see 
also Marmor et al., 1986). Sapolsky ( 1987) made 
the additional point that the health-care system 
has traditionally depended on a system of cross-
subsidies: the rich subsidize the poor, the well 
subsidize the sick, and the young subsidize the 
old. Burdened by the most expensive patients, 
the old and the poor. the Federal government 
eventually sought to reduce its own costs 
through narrowly focused legislation that con-
trolled costs for only Medicare and Medicaid 
patients, and subsequent DRG legislation that 
covertly controlled costs by using its legislative 
power to gain a special advantage for itself, 
thereby weakening the effect of the cross-
subsidies and forcing displaced costs onto 
others. The Federal government enjoyed partial 
relief, but other private payers of significant 
clout like Blue Cross faced higher costs for non-
Medicare patients. These private payers would 
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begin actively to bargain for discounts and to 
seek alternative health delivery systems for its 
own clients, thereby forcing even greater costs 
on less powerful third parties or patient-payers 
- price takers lacking the capacity of price 
makers for collective action and effective 
resistance (Clegg, 1989a). 
Hospital administrators, meanwhile, have no 
choice but to conform to PL 98-21 for their 
Medicare patients. With reference to power, the 
motivation lying behind this conformity is, quite 
understandably, to advocate for the hospital by 
maximizing Federal and other third-party pay-
ments. Thus, one would expect their primary 
focus in using the DRG-based system to be on 
generating, as opposed to merely internally 
allocating, resources. This focus on obtaining 
economic resources is instrumentally rational; 
consequently, one can see the use of DRGs by 
hospitals as a technological solution to its 
problem of obtaining scarce resources (Hackman, 
1985; Perrow,1985). 
The process behind this generation, which 
seeks to demonstrate PL 98-21 conformity, is, 
however, one of political advocacy (Meyer, A., 
1984; Boland & Pondy, 1983; Covaleski & 
Dirsmith, 1988b). At issue is whether hospital 
administrators will, in fact, turn the externally 
directed DRG-based, case-mix-augmented 
accounting system inwardly to allocate resources 
among subunits. Given that accounting is a 
generally accepted if not a taken-for-granted 
process for guiding resource allocation deci-
sions in a variety of organizational contexts, and 
that it provides the appearance of neutrality, 
objectivity and verifiability, it may also serve as 
a convenient, autoregulatory means for allocat-
ing resources internally. One may argue that the 
discretion for its application does not, after all, 
rest completely with the hospital administrators 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Harris, 1977; Scott & 
Backman, 1990) but derives from Federal law. 
If it is, in fact turned inwardly, the result would 
be to couple external imagery and internal 
operating processes. On this internal use of the 
DRG framework and case-mix accounting, Clegg 
(1989b) has suggested that surveillance prac-
tices may be used as means for determining 
power in that such practices as the DRG 
framework do not provide for their own inter-
pretation, but must rather be transformed by 
organizational actors - here, hospital admini-
strators (Freidson, 1986; see also Chua & 
Degeling, 1989, for a further development of 
this theme as it applies to the use of DRGs). 
Once more, case-mix accounting may be used 
as a political device, this time for transforming 
the DRG framework and case-mix accounting 
systems into a specific, organizationally directed 
surveillance practice for legitimating the alloca-
tion decisions made by administrators and, in 
so doing, influencing those allocations. Con-
sequently, anticipating the RQ2 analysis, the 
existence of Federally mandated DRG payment 
systems carries a definite potential for penetrat-
ing backstage operating processes and revealing 
which departments or "product lines" get what 
financial resources for what purposes (Powell, 
1985). 
DRGs and case-mix accounting may also serve 
a more direct role: the redistribution of power 
within hospitals. As a form of what Mintzberg 
(1979) called "a professional bureaucracy", 
physicians have long acted as autonomous 
practitioners and have consequently long pos-
sessed organizational power (Freidson, 1986; 
Abbott, 1988; Scott & Backman, 1990). For 
example, physicians have traditionally made 
unilateral admissions, treatment, length-of-stay, 
and discharge decisions. They have also figured 
prominently in hospital cost structures and are 
accordingly a principal target of control for case-
mix accounting systems. Here, amid a rhetoric 
extolling measures of facilitating physicians' 
efforts to limit unnecessary procedures and 
enhancing their own efficiency and effectiveness 
(see, for example, Thompson, 1978, 1981), 
case-mix accounting systems focus on isolating 
varianq:s among doctors in billings to DRG-
defined groups as compared to hospital or 
industry standards (Berki, 1983; Fetter, 1991). 
By making these consequences visible (Becker 
& Neuhauser, 1975), administrators can covertly 
influence the admissions, treatment, length-of-
stay and discharge decisions, thus reinforcing 
Clegg's (1987) emphasis on power as closely 
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begin actively to bargain for discounts and to 
seek alternative health delivery systems for its 
own clients, thereby forcing even greater costs 
on less powerful third parties or patient-payers 
- price takers lacking the capacity of price 
makers for collective action and effective 
resistance (Clegg, 1989a). 
Hospital administrators, meanwhile, have no 
choice but to conform to PL 98-21 for their 
Medicare patients. With reference to power, the 
motivation lying behind this conformity is, quite 
understandably, to advocate for the hospital by 
maximizing Federal and other third-party pay-
ments. Thus, one would expect their primary 
focus in using the DRG-based system to be on 
generating, as opposed to merely internally 
allocating, resources. This focus on obtaining 
economic resources is instrumentally rational; 
consequently, one can see the use of DRGs by 
hospitals as a technological solution to its 
problem of obtaining scarce resources (Hackman, 
1985; Perrow,1985). 
The process behind this generation, which 
seeks to demonstrate PL 98-21 conformity, is, 
however, one of political advocacy (Meyer, A., 
1984; Boland & Pondy, 1983; Covaleski & 
Dirsmith, 1988b). At issue is whether hospital 
administrators will, in fact, turn the externally 
directed DRG-based, case-mix-augmented 
accounting system inwardly to allocate resources 
among subunits. Given that accounting is a 
generally accepted if not a taken-for-granted 
process for guiding resource allocation deci-
sions in a variety of organizational contexts, and 
that it provides the appearance of neutrality, 
objectivity and verifiability, it may also serve as 
a convenient, autoregulatory means for allocat-
ing resources internally. One may argue that the 
discretion for its application does not, after all, 
rest completely with the hospital administrators 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Harris, 1977; Scott & 
Backman, 1990) but derives from Federal law. 
If it is, in fact turned inwardly, the result would 
be to couple external imagery and internal 
operating processes. On this internal use of the 
DRG framework and case-mix accounting, Clegg 
(1989b) has suggested that surveillance prac-
tices may be used as means for determining 
power in that such practices as the DRG 
framework do not provide for their own inter-
pretation, but must rather be transformed by 
organizational actors - here, hospital admini-
strators (Freidson, 1986; see also Chua & 
Degeling, 1989, for a further development of 
this theme as it applies to the use of DRGs). 
Once more, case-mix accounting may be used 
as a political device, this time for transforming 
the DRG framework and case-mix accounting 
systems into a specific, organizationally directed 
surveillance practice for legitimating the alloca-
tion decisions made by administrators and, in 
so doing, influencing those allocations. Con-
sequently, anticipating the RQ2 analysis, the 
existence of Federally mandated DRG payment 
systems carries a definite potential for penetrat-
ing backstage operating processes and revealing 
which departments or "product lines" get what 
financial resources for what purposes (Powell, 
1985). 
DRGs and case-mix accounting may also serve 
a more direct role: the redistribution of power 
within hospitals. As a form of what Mintzberg 
( 1979) called "a professional bureaucracy", 
physicians have long acted as autonomous 
practitioners and have consequently long pos-
sessed organizational power (Freidson, 1986; 
Abbott, 1988; Scott & Backman, 1990). For 
example, physicians have traditionally made 
unilateral admissions, treatment, length-of-stay, 
and discharge decisions. They have also figured 
prominently in hospital cost structures and are 
accordingly a principal target of control for case-
mix accounting systems. Here, amid a rhetoric 
extolling measures of facilitating physicians' 
efforts to limit unnecessary procedures and 
enhancing their own efficiency and effectiveness 
(see, for example, Thompson, 1978, 1981), 
case-mix accounting systems focus on isolating 
variances among doctors in billings to DRG-
defined groups as compared to hospital or 
industry standards (Berki, 1983; Fetter, 1991). 
By making these consequences visible (Becker 
& Neuhauser, 1975), administrators can covertly 
influence the admissions, treatment, length-of-
stay and discharge decisions, thus reinforcing 
Clegg's (1987) emphasis on power as closely 
INSTITIITIONAL TIlEORY PERSPECTIVE 73 
associated with the interpretation and applica-
tion of a set of rules and disciplinary practices 
(see also DiMaggio, 1988; Zucker,1988b). 
The foregoing analysis brings together strands 
of thought susceptible to further analysis in 
future research. The DRG framework appears to 
be more than merely a passive medium for 
expressing societal expectations (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). It also provides more than mere 
additional justification for case-mix accounting, 
which further embodies and expresses these 
expectations. Rather, the DRG and case-mix 
accounting phenomena appear to be, them-
selves, infused with power and self-interest 
(Perrow, 1985; Powell, 1985; DiMaggio, 1988). 
The arguments advanced primarily by Clegg 
(1987, 1989a, b) suggest that the DRG frame-
work and the related case-mix accounting 
systems may be interpreted as means for 
effecting macro- and micro-surveillance in 
which individuals (both physicians and patients), 
collectives (departments, individual hospitals 
and classes of hospitals) and services ( as 
organized into "product lines") are categorized 
and discriminated through apparently objective 
calculations that form a virtually anonymous 
discipline strategy. As a form of disciplinary 
practice, the framework inscribes and normal-
izes hospitals, clinicians, and patients as well. 
The DRG framework and related case-mix 
accounting systems appear also to determine 
power by redistributing that power from physi-
cian to administrator. Together, the DRG and 
case-mix accounting phenomena may be seen as 
two variants of disciplinary practice that cal-
culate macro, societal-level (that is to say, the 
Federal government) and micro, organization-
level ( the hospitals) rationality from the distinct 
auspices of power. 
Viewed as an unfinished process in which the 
DRG and case-mix accounting phenomena 
currently operate, institutionalization appears to 
be infused with power and vested interests in 
the health-care environment. The DRG frame-
work and case-mix accounting appear to serve 
simultaneously as ( 1 ) technological solutions to 
the Federal government's need to control its 
health-care cash outlays; (2) a political ex-
change allowing the government to act covertly 
in its own self-interest in a seemingly apolitical 
way, to determine power, and to enable hospital 
administrators to redistribute power in the 
name of objectivity, efficiency and profitability; 
and (3) a means of social discourse expressing 
the government's need to control health-care 
costs to hospitals and to departments and 
individual health practitioners in a way that 
health -care providers can accept or at least resist 
only ineffectively. 
On this latter point pertaining to the ability 
to resist, we earlier posed the following research 
question: 
RQ 2. To what extent do institutionalized legitimation 
practices (in the current context, case·mix accounting 
systems developed in response to DRG payment 
systems) penetrate and influence internal organizational 
practices? 
Consistent with the theme already advanced 
with regard to power - that such disciplinary 
and surveillance practices as the DRG frame-
work and case-mix accounting define and 
normalize the activities of both organized bodies 
and individuals (Clegg, 1989a, b) - one can 
partition the answer to this question on three 
related levels as concerning hospitals, depart-
ments and patients (see Tolbert, 1988, who 
concluded that the issue of decoupling can be 
addressed only by concentrating on the micro-
or organization-level effects of institutionalized 
practices ). 
At the first level of analysis, the exercise of 
power necessarily involves both obedience to 
disciplinary practices and reciprocal resistance 
(Clegg, 1989b ), where effective resistance 
contributes to the decoupling between institu-
tionalized practices and internal operations. Just 
as the exercise of power need not be overt, 
effective resistance by the subjects of control 
may involve covertly circumventing or divert-
ing disciplinary practices to their own ends. In 
such cases, the relative power of, or resources 
deployed by, those being controlled determines 
the effectiveness of the resistance. From an 
institutional theory perspective, Scott (1987, p. 
509) described this precise situation, arguing 
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that the outcomes of institutionalization are 
shaped by both the differential resources and 
the ability to lay successful claim to the 
normative and cognitive facets of the political 
processes. 
Ascribing to this reasoning, Sapolsky (1987) 
observed that private, financially stronger hos-
pitals having a relatively diverse resource base 
could use case-mix accounting data to screen 
patients and admit or "skim" only the more profit-
able ones (Fetter & Freeman, 1986; Eastaugh, 
1987). Here, the similarity to Starr's (1982) 
prediction that the private-sector logic of 
commercialism and depersonalization would 
one day influence health care is particularly 
striking. In part, Sapolsky reasoned, the screen-
ing would be abetted by such large insurers as 
Blue Cross: 
Discount-seeking payers encourage the "skimming" of 
patients from hospitals by entrepreneurial ventures such 
as those that create medicine's newest and most lucrative 
specializations. With the growing surplus of phYSiCians, 
it is easier and easier to promise large payers bargains 
by providing services in specialized settings unencum-
bered by the reserve capacity and costly overheads 
needed to maintain tertiary care facilities. Bargains for 
some, no doubt, but this pattern of stripping away 
profitable clients destroys the complex web of cross-
subsidies that in large part supports teaching and services 
for the poor and for those with rare or expensive illnesses 
(1987, p. 70). 
Thus, one can find a dark aspect of DRGs and 
case-mix accounting on the bright side of profits. 
Concerning this darkness, Sapolsky effectively 
argued that such financially strained facilities as 
inner-city hospitals, as well as employers and 
insurers unable to resist covert regulation, are 
more heavily affected by the DRG phenomenon 
because they increasingly attract more of the 
most costly patients, whose related revenue is 
fixed by DRG payment schedules, than the 
attractive patients the more profitable institu-
tions accept: 
Small employers and insurers are not the only potential 
victims of [the] "beggar thy neighbor" strategy. Some 
hospitals lack a sufficient number of privately insured 
patients to absorb the losses sustained in meeting 
government demands for price advantages. Especially 
vulnerable are inner city hospitals that serve the 
uninsured and that often maintain expensive teaching 
programs ( 1987, p. 70). [While DRG payments are based 
on average cost per category for average patients for 
average stays, the poor and elderly are liable to be above 
average in all categories.] 
Consistent with Scott's (1987) and Clegg's 
(1989a, b) positions, profitable hospitals seem 
more liable to "skim" patients and in so doing 
lay cognitive claim to the normative and 
cognitive facets of the DRG system. It seems 
certain that the social network of hospitals will 
be affected thereby, and one could infer that the 
decoupling between external symbolic displays 
and internal operating processes will be in-
fluenced by the differential resource munificence 
or scarcity of hospitals: the financially strained 
hospitals would receive relatively few resources 
while the backstage operating processes for the 
profitable hospitals would enjoy a decoupling 
from their external legitimation practices of 
adopting the DRG framework and case-mix 
accounting systems. 
At the second level oj analysis, one can 
generally expect that effective resistance to or 
decoupling from the disciplinary practices of 
the DRG and case-mix accounting phenomena 
will be conditioned by the differential resources 
of the departments within hospitals. In support 
of this expectation, empirical research on 
budgeting (see, for example, Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1974; Hills & Mahoney, 1978; Hackman, 1985; 
Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988b) suggests that 
accounting information plays more of a political 
advocacy role in organizations characterized by 
financial hardship. More specifically, Hackman 
(1985) found that a subunit with high visibility 
among external constituents and a concomitant 
ability to acquire the external resources needed 
by the organization, strongly influenced internal 
resource allocations and gained for itself a dis-
proportionate share of those internal resources. 
Extending this line of thought with respect to 
power, whereas financially strong hospitals may 
effectively decouple external imagery from 
backstage operating processes, possibly by 
carefully skimming profitable patients (Eastaugh, 
1987; Sapolsky, 1987), poorer hospitals may 
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expect different departments to generate diffe-
rential revenues, incur differential costs and 
earn differential profits. Thus, departments may 
exhibit a differential ability to help hospital 
administrators perform their advocacy or 
revenue generating functions. Consistent with 
the prescriptions of orthodox commentators 
like Fetter & Freeman (1986) and Eastaugh 
(1987), administrators may then be expected 
to allocate an increased proportion of resources 
to departments that help generate the most 
resources, thus at once recognizing and aug-
menting the internal power of those departments. 
To the extent that the institutionalized DRG 
framework and the resultant case-mix account-
ing system influence the internal allocation of 
resources, external imagery can penetrate and 
alter backstage operating processes in financially 
strained hospitals. From the perspective of the 
department heads, the use of DRGs and case-
mix accounting to demonstrate profitability 
appears simultaneously to be a means of political 
exchange and a technological solution wherein 
their own effective support of the system both 
permits hospital administrators to perform their 
advocacy function so as to generate resources 
externally, and facilitates their own advocacy 
role insofar as they receive a greater portion of 
those resources that are, in tum, deployed in 
treating patients. 
As we noted earlier in our discussion of 
power, an imposition of the DRG framework and 
case-mix accounting may contribute to the 
transfer of admission, treatment, length-of-stay 
and discharge decisions from physicians to 
administrators who are, in tum, supported by 
these seemingly neutral objective surveillance 
practices (Freidson, 1986). Thus, these two 
phenomena exemplify the encoding expertise 
in a hospital's organizational structure and away 
from individuals (Abbott, 1988). The potential 
transfer of these four critical patient-treatment 
decisions suggests a potential for affecting the 
very health of patients. On this point, Shortell 
and Hughes observed that 
There is growing concern that, as hospitals are 
increasingly buffeted by external pressures to reduce 
costs, they may be forced to allocate resources in ways 
that could adversely affect patients' care. Under the 
Medicare prospective payment system, for instance, 
hospitals have incentives to discourage the admission of 
beneficiaries with high costs, to reduce the diagnostic 
and therapeutic resources used for these beneficiaries, 
and to discharge them sooner. [Witness Eastaugh's 
(1987) and Young & Saltman's (1983) positions in 
advocating DRG-systems discussed earlier.) Anyone of 
these responses could result in adverse outcomes. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that such adverse outcomes 
may already be occurring (1988, p. 110 1 ). 
In an effort to augment this anecdotal 
evidence, Shortell & Hughes ( 1988) conducted 
an empirical analysis of 214,839 discharges from 
981 hospitals. They found a significant associa-
tion between higher mortality rates among in-
patients, and (a) the stringency in state programs 
of hospital rate reviews ( closely associated with 
DRG rates where case-mix accounting informa-
tion guides an evaluation of the rates); (b) the 
stringency of certificate-of-need legislation; and 
( c) the intensity of competition in the health-
care marketplace (this latter finding suggests 
support for Sapolsky's, 1987, profitable patient 
"skimming" argument). Shortell and Hughes 
found that hospitals in states with stringent rate 
reviews produced death rates 6-10% higher 
than hospitals in less stringent states. One may 
infer that societal expectations, as expressed in 
the form of externally directed, DRG-based 
symbolic displays, can in fact penetrate external 
operating processes and affect the patients 
themselves (Powell, 1985). 
IMPUCATIONS AND CONCLUDING 
DISCUSSION 
In contrast with the orthodox perspective, 
which asserts that accounting in general (for 
example, Ijiri, 1965; Horngren, 1977; Cooper & 
Kaplan, 1991) and the DRG framework and case-
mix accounting systems in particular ( for 
example, Fetter & Freeman, 1986; Cook et al., 
1983, 1985; Havighurst, 1987; Fetter, A. et al., 
1991) faithfully represent an organization's 
economic or technical reality, institutional 
theory (for example, Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
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DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) offers compelling 
insights into the social and behavioral facets of 
these surveillance practices. This perspective 
suggests that one cannot understand such 
organizational and regulatory practices as the 
DRG framework and case-mix accounting merely 
with reference to the general rationality of their 
structural properties. On this point, Clegg 
argued that 
Organizations should not be conceptualized as the 
phenomenal expression of some essential inner principle 
such as economic exploitation or rationality .... One 
cannot explain the politics of all organizations in terms 
of general theories of their rationality. Organizational 
action is an indeterminate outcome of substantive 
struggles between different agencies: between people 
who deploy different resources; people whose organiza· 
tional identities will be shaped by the way in which 
disciplinary practices work through and on them, even 
in their use of such techniques; people who seek to 
control and decide the nature of organizational action. 
Consequently, the interests of actors in organizations 
and the decisions that they make are necessarily 
contingent on various forms of organization calculation. 
Thus, organizational action cannot be the expression of 
some essential inner principle: claims to such principles 
as prime movers necessarily neglect the actual complex 
and contingent conditions under which organizational 
action occurs (1989b, p. 105). 
Consistent with this pOsition, we conclude that 
one can more accurately characterize such 
practices as the DRG framework and case-mix 
accounting as social in nature, practices whose 
principal purpose is at once to express and 
demonstrate a conformity with institutionalized 
rules and expectations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Our analysis also suggests that the two 
criticisms made of institutional theory dealing 
with power and decoupling and expressed as 
our two research questions tend to be interre-
lated. Moreover, at least as one interprets them 
in a health-care context, hierarchical order is 
implicit in them. More specifically, power 
emerges as the important dynamic that condi-
tions the issue of decoupling (Perrow, 1985, 
1986; Powell, 1985; Clegg, 1989a, b). Because 
the DRG framework and related case-mix 
accounting systems undergo continual refine-
ment as hospitals implement and use them, they 
may be seen as unfinished processes infused 
with power, rather than merely as outcomes 
beyond the reach of vested interests (DiMaggio, 
1988; Clegg, 1989a, b). Here, the analysis 
suggests that the Federal government could not 
exercise power overtly to reflect its own self-
interest because of the force with which the 
hospital industry opposed that intrusion. Instead, 
the government deployed a formal, structural 
surveillance practice - the DRG framework -
developed in part by the hospital industry itself, 
to reflect its interest indirectly without arousing 
active resistance (Scott, 1987). This exercise 
was covert and, perhaps consequently, effective 
(Burns, 1986). 
It follows that the use of such disciplinary and 
surveillance practices represents one of the 
subtlest and most effective tools for influencing 
if not controlling a social situation, an adroit 
substitute for the overt use of power, the very 
deployment of which might actually signal weak-
ness (Pfeffer, 1981; Edelman, 1977; Hopwood, 
1984). Here, the Federal government mani-
fested true power by excusing hospitals from 
cost-cutting efforts they otherwise would not 
have undertaken, but then convincing the 
hospitals to undertake these efforts voluntarily. 
Though these rules and disciplinary and surveil-
lance practices were cloaked in the appearance 
of objectivity and neutrality, the interested 
parties who are both game players and referees 
had yet to interpret them; the interpreting act, 
of course, establishes and maintains the hier-
archies of authority and status (Clegg, 1989a, 
b). Clegg concluded that such organizations as 
hospitals survive by conforming to those interests 
that are hierarchically superior, like the state, in 
part by conforming to their disciplinary and 
surveillance practices, demonstrating this con-
formity externally, and reaffirming their efficacy 
internally. 
Within individual hospitals, the institutional-
ization of DRGs as an ongoing process appears 
to be similarly political. Hospital administrators 
may use the DRG framework to advocate for the 
hospital and to help generate resources - acts 
both broadly rational and political (Alan Meyer, 
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1984; Hackman, 1985). But this advocacy is at 
once determined by and determines power as 
expressed by the availability of existing re-
sources and the capacity to lay cognitive claim 
to (Scott, 1987) and divert to its own purposes 
(Clegg, 1989a, b), the DRG framework. More 
specifically, financially stronger hospitals, the 
profitable and for-profit ones, have the capacity 
to "skim" (Sapolsky, 1987) those types of 
patients who receive a profitable "product line" 
of services, leaving unprofitable patients, largely 
the poor and the elderly, to be served by 
financially weak hospitals without the ability to 
divert the DRG framework. 
Within individual hospitals, the institutional-
ization of the DRG framework and case-mix 
accounting systems as ongoing processes also 
appears to be profoundly political and potentially 
complicit in a shift in the balance of power from 
the practitioner to the administrative compo-
nents of the hospitals (Freidson, 1986) and 
among departmental units. To begin with, DRG-
based case-mix accounting was developed and 
implemented by the industry to facilitate the 
allocation of resources internally as well as to 
provide a convenient, apparently objective, and 
neutral cost containment discourse. With the 
revenue and cost consequences of a physician's 
admission, treatment, length-of-stay and dis-
charge decisions made more visible (in DRG 
payments and as revealed by case-mix account-
ing), power shifts from the physician to the 
hospital administrator (Clegg, 1989a, b; Freidson, 
1986) in the sense that expertise becomes 
encoded within organizational structure rather 
than in the individual (Abbott, 1988). 
In addition, one can associate the deployment 
of these systems with a shift in resource 
allocation toward departmental units having 
higher visibility among external constituents, as 
evidenced by their ability to generate more 
revenues for the hospital- all of which couples 
external imagery and backstage process. Consis-
tent with this theme, departmental managers, 
whose effectiveness depends on how profitably 
they manage their DRG categories and with 
varying abilities to lay cognitive claim (Scott, 
1987) to these two surveillance practices and 
divert them to their own ends (Clegg, 1989a, 
b), may use case-mix accounting information to 
advocate for the subunit and gain more resources. 
Accounting, in such a situation, is both 
rational and covertly political. That is, case-mix 
accounting information may both provide a 
technical solution to the rationalistic goal of 
generating more resources and serve as a means 
of fostering political exchanges wherein social 
actors redistribute power. But here too, the 
relative financial strength of the hospital may 
well mitigate both the power dynamics of 
deploying case-mix accounting and the extent 
to which external imagery penetrates and alters 
backstage operating processes. Profitable hos-
pitals may be able to decouple their external 
imagery from internal processes by actively 
screening patients, and in so doing avoid the 
need to exercise power internally. Financially 
weaker (typically, urban) hospitals generally 
cannot divert the DRG and case-mix accounting 
surveillance practices to their own ends (Clegg, 
1989a, b). 
We conclude that the institutional perspec-
tive contributes Significant insights to the 
development and implementation of the DRG 
framework and case-mix accounting in the 
American health-care context and that this 
context, in tum, provides a unique opportunity 
for extending institutional theory.2 We recommend 
2 This analysis used institutional theory to widen the conceptualization of the DRG framework and case-mix accounting. 
But, the analysis is relatively provincia! in that it examined only the u.s. health-care environment. The DRG framework 
is being exported to other countries, which use the same basic treatment categorie~, sometimes fortified by and sometimes 
lacking case-mix accounting systems. Because this framework now appears around the world and in some countries that 
use different accounting systems, the DRG framework offers an ideal opportunity to study institutionalization internationally. 
Meyer (1986) noted that accounting as an institutionalized process may be expected to vary systematically in different 
national societies. For example, the U.S. reflects both an accounting and a legal orientation, while the u.K. reflects more 
of an accounting than a legal orientation, Germany reflects more of a legal than an accounting orientation, and France 
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future research be directed at examining (a) 
institutionalization as an ongoing process 
- in that the DRG framework and case-mix 
accounting are currently being implemented 
and refined in numerous health-care delivery 
organizations - rather than as an outcome; (b) 
the complicity of the DRG framework and case-
mix accounting in the covert exercise of power, 
where that power is expressed in terms of 
resource availability and scarcity and the ability 
to lay cognitive claim to these two surveillance 
practices and divert them to various interested 
parties; and (c) the extent to which power 
conditions the decoupling that may take place 
between external imagery and internal social 
and technical operating processes. 
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